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Abstract
Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition
in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto
and Peeters (2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the impli-
cations of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory.
Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a con-
ception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with
current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a con-
ception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right,
then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question
might respond to Hutto and Peeters’ argument in two ways. First, they
might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge
the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theo-
ries are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that,
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact
aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory:
radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have
begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless
conception of memory traces.
1 Radical enactivism meets the philosophy of
memory
In opposition to the representationalist approaches that have long dominated
cognitive science, Hutto and Myin’s (2013; 2017) radical enactivism maintains
that, as a general principle, cognition is best explained not in terms of represen-
tation but rather in terms of the reactivation, in response to current environ-
mental stimuli, of neural patterns shaped by the subject’s previous interactions
with his environment. Critics of this alternative approach have charged that it is
unable to explain paradigmatically representational forms of cognition, includ-
ing remembering. Earlier work on radical enactivism (2013) did indeed focus
primarily on basic forms of cognition, such as perception, but radical enactivists
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have recently turned their attention to remembering and other non-basic forms
of cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2017). In the first systematic discussion of the
relationship between radical enactivism and mainstream philosophical theories
of memory, Hutto and Peeters (2018) argue that the account that emerges when
radical enactivism is applied to memory poses a significant challenge to current
causal and postcausal theories.
This paper aims to get beyond Hutto and Peeters’ “radical” rhetoric in or-
der to draw out the implications of their account for a cluster of (post)causal
theories: the classical causal theory (Martin and Deutscher, 1966) and a neo-
classical variant thereof (Bernecker, 2010), the simulation theory (Michaelian,
2016b), and the recently-proposed procedural causal theory (Perrin, 2018).1
There are, of course, other theories on which we might have focused, but this
particular cluster constitutes a natural starting point. The (neo)classical causal
theory continues to occupy a dominant position in the philosophy of memory
and is one of Hutto and Peeters’ primary targets. The simulation theory is a
descendant of and opponent to the causal theory and, despite being motivated
by many of the same considerations that motivate the radical enactivist account
of remembering, is singled out by Hutto and Peeters for special criticism: on
their view, the simulation theory, though it differs from the causal theory in
important respects, retains those features of the latter that render it incom-
patible with radical enactivism. The procedural causal theory, while it is not
discussed by Hutto and Peeters, is likewise motivated by considerations similar
to those that motivate radical enactivism; it promises, moreover, to point the
way to a version of the simulation theory that jettisons the features singled out
for criticism by Hutto and Peeters.
We proceed as follows. In section 2, we zero in on the “no content” claim—
according to which memory traces should be understood as not having content—
that we see as constituting the core of Hutto and Peeters’ account. In section
3, we reconstruct their argument for the claim as it pertains to procedural,
semantic, and episodic memory, and, in section 4, we explore its implications
for mainstream theories of episodic remembering, concluding that Hutto and
Peeters may well be right about the contentless character of traces but that
they are nevertheless wrong about the compatibility of radical enactivism and
certain of these theories: recent causal theories (namely, the procedural causal
theory) and postcausal theories (namely, a “nontransmissionist” version of the
simulation theory) may not be motivated by the sort of general hostility to
mental content that animates radical enactivism, but they can in fact take the
“no content” claim on board. Section 5 brings the paper to a close with a
discussion of the implications of this conclusion for ongoing debates over the
taxonomy of memory and memory errors.
Before proceeding, we pause to emphasize two points. First, nothing in
what follows is meant to rule out the possibility that radical enactivism will
1Our focus here will be exclusively on radical enactivism, and we will have nothing to say
about the implications of other forms of enactivism for the philosophy of memory. Hutto and
Myin (2013) argue that “sensorimotor enactivism” (Hurley, 1998; O’Regan and Noe¨, 2001;
Noe¨, 2004) takes perception to be a matter of embodied action but does not entirely give up
on the idea that perception is representational, while “autopoeitic enactivism” (Varela et al.,
1991; Thompson, 2007) relies on metaphors (e.g., “interpretation”, “sense-making”) that are
often understood in representational terms. Radical enactivism, we take it, is meant to differ
from these other enactivist approaches in that it attempts to break entirely with the view
that cognition involves representation.
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ultimately turn out to be incompatible with the procedural causal theory or the
simulation theory due to disagreement over issues other than the contentless or
contentful character of memory traces. Where potential tensions between these
theories and radical enactivism are evident, we note them, but our aim here is
the restricted one of determining whether (post)causal theorists can take the
core of Hutto and Peeters’ account—that is, the “no content” claim—on board,
and we remain agnostic with respect to the implications of radical enactivism
as a whole. Second, we likewise remain agnostic with respect to the ultimate
viability of radical enactivism in its own right, taken either as an approach to
memory in particular or as an approach to cognition in general.2 The perspective
that we adopt here is that of the philosophy of memory, in the sense that we
are concerned specifically with the relationship between radical enactivism and
philosophical theories of memory—our aim is not to assess the success of Hutto
and Peeters’ argument for radical enactivism about memory or that of the more
general radical enactivist arguments advanced by Hutto, Myin, and others.
2 Content, construction, and cognitive exten-
sion
In developing their account, Hutto and Peeters appeal to three distinct bodies
of theory, invoking treatments of remembering as, first, extended and embodied
(Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Sutton and Williamson, 2014), second, reconstruc-
tive, simulative, or imaginative (Perrin and Michaelian, 2017; Sant’Anna, 2018;
Michaelian et al., 201x), and, third, nonrepresentational or contentless (Loader,
2013; De Brigard, 2014).3 The aspects of remembering on which the first two of
these focus would seem, on the face of it, to pair naturally with an account of
remembering as involving the retrieval of stored content, but Hutto and Peeters
argue that they are in fact best accommodated by an enactivist version of the
sort of contentless account suggested by the third. An enactivist account of
remembering as “creative, dynamic, and wide-reaching”, they argue, “can more
easily accommodate [the relevant empirical findings] than cognitivist accounts
that conceive of remembering as always involving passive recollections that occur
wholly and solely inside heads” (2018, 98). They continue: “[a]ccording to our
enactivist proposal, the roots of remembering can be understood in line with [the
principle that] invoking neural, bodily and environmental factors can all make
equally important contributions when it comes to explaining and characterizing
cognitive activity” (2018, 98). The relevant bodies of theory are discussed as
2Radical enactivism has been the target of a number of objections (see Myin and Hutto
2015). Some have objected that, given the entrenched status of the concept of content in phi-
losophy and its explanatory utility in cognitive science, radical enactivists have not provided
sufficient reason for abandoning it (Campbell, 2014; Shapiro, 2014; Colombo, 2014). Others
have objected that radical enactivists have not adequately taken concepts of representation
that do not appeal to accuracy conditions into account (Roberts, 2013; G ladziejewski, 2015).
And others have objected that radical enactivists have not provided clear positive accounts
of specific forms of cognition, as opposed to negative arguments against representationalist
accounts (Shapiro, 2014). The account of remembering proposed by Hutto and Peeters can
be seen as providing a partial response to the last of these objections.
3Hutto and Peeters read De Brigard as endorsing a contentless conception of traces.
Though he does not explicitly make this claim, we will not challenge their reading here.
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appropriate in sections 3–4 below.4 The point to note at this stage is just that
the account that we will refer to as “radical enactivism about memory” fore-
grounds, first, the role of environmental (and bodily) resources in remembering,
and second, the reconstructive character of remembering.
In Hutto and Peeters’ view, these first two features of the account already
mean that radical enactivism about memory is at odds with mainstream theo-
ries of memory. We will see, however, that many mainstream theories can and
do acknowledge that remembering is both extended and reconstructive. Its em-
phasis on the extended and reconstructive aspects of remembering, then, is not
what is distinctive of radical enactivism about memory. What is distinctive—or
what at least initially appears to be distinctive—is a third feature of the ac-
count, namely, its stance with respect to content. Hutto and Peeters argue that
“we achieve a stronger and more elegant account of the basis of remembering by
going radically enactivist—viz. by abandoning the widely held assumption that
remembering always and everywhere involves the retrieval of stored information
or content in order to represent events” (2018, 98; emphasis added). The gist
of their claim is clear enough, but it is worth pointing out that the way they
formulate it here is potentially misleading. Radical enactivism about memory
does not (as their subsequent discussion makes clear) simply reject the claim
that remembering always involves the retrieval of stored content, which would
not rule out the possibility that remembering sometimes involves the retrieval of
stored content; instead, it endorses the claim that remembering never involves
the retrieval of stored content. We will refer to this as the “no content” claim
(NC).5
NC is, as stated, ambiguous, in the sense that it might be taken to apply
either to memory in general or, instead, to one or more specific kinds of mem-
ory. It is standard, both in philosophy and in the empirical sciences of memory,
to distinguish between procedural memory (roughly, “remembering how”) and
declarative memory (“remembering that”) (Werning and Cheng, 2017). Within
the category of declarative memory, in turn, it is standard to distinguish be-
tween episodic memory and semantic memory. Episodic memory is memory for
experienced past events (e.g., remembering visiting Wellington for the first time)
(Tulving, 1972) and is sometimes thought to essentially involve a specific form
of consciousness, autonoesis (Tulving 2005; Klein 2015; see section 5 below).
Semantic memory, on the other hand, is memory for facts in general and need
not refer to specific events (e.g., remembering that Wellington is the capital of
New Zealand).
Depending on the kind or kinds of memory to which NC is applied, we end
up with a more or less surprising or “radical” approach:
(NC-procedural) Procedural remembering does not involve the retrieval of
stored content.
(NC-semantic) Semantic remembering does not involve the retrieval of stored
content.
4With respect to the first body of theory, we focus on extended rather than embodied
aspects of remembering. This is in keeping with Hutto and Peeters’ own focus.
5Since our focus here is on radical enactivism, we will have nothing to say about the
relationship between Hutto and Peeters’ argument for NC and historical attacks on contentful
traces. For background on this history, see chapter 16 of Sutton 1998.
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(NC-episodic) Episodic remembering does not involve the retrieval of stored
content.
While there is no obvious reason for adopting NC-semantic and NC-episodic
without also adopting NC-procedural, we will see that one might well want to
adopt NC-procedural without also adopting NC-semantic or NC-episodic. We
will also see that NC-procedural is not particularly surprising. In contrast,
NC-semantic is already highly counterintuitive, and NC-episodic is yet more
counterintuitive: it is (to put it mildly) difficult to see how one might hope to
provide an account of episodic memory—which is increasingly understood as a
form of episodic imagination, which is, in turn, usually taken to be a paradigm
representational capacity—without invoking informational or representational
content.
3 The “no content” claim
One might thus expect Hutto and Peeters to begin straightaway with treat-
ments of episodic remembering as a reconstructive, simulative, or imaginative
process, but they begin, instead, with Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) treatment of
remembering as a form of extended cognition, invoking the now-familiar thought
experiment of Otto and his notebook and Inga and her brain, the result of which
is supposed to be that Otto’s notebook, said to be his “external memory”, is
just as much a part of his mind as Inga’s “internal memory” is of hers. It is
worth following them in this, as doing so will serve to clarify what, exactly, is
at stake in NC.
When they introduced their thought experiment, Clark and Chalmers de-
scribed the relationship between Otto and his notebook in thoroughly repre-
sentationalist terms, taking the latter to be a store, functionally equivalent to
Inga’s memory, for information or content: just as Inga (they suppose) forms
beliefs by retrieving content from her internal memory, Otto is said to form
beliefs by retrieving content from his external memory. If this description of the
case were taken for granted, cognitive extension would appear to be straightfor-
wardly incompatible with NC and hence with radical enactivism about memory.
Hutto and Peeters, however, reject Clark and Chalmers’ “first-wave” (Sutton,
2010) take on cognitive extension, following Loader (2013) in arguing that it
rests on an untenable “commodity conception” of memories.
The commodity conception treats engrams (internal memory traces) and
exograms (external memory traces) as being effectively interchangeable—units
of content capable, in principle, of being stored in brains, notebooks, and various
other locations. Now, philosophers of memory have often observed that the
storage format employed by internal memory in fact differs greatly from that
employed by external memory (Sutton, 2010; Michaelian, 2012), and, from the
perspective of the philosophy of memory, we thus might initially suspect that
Hutto and Peeters reject the first-wave take on cognitive extension because they
reject its assumption that internal and external memory share a common storage
format. The suspicion would, however, be misplaced.
Clark and Chalmers’ argument notoriously appeals to the notion of parity
between internal and external resources, the idea being that, if an external re-
source performs a role that would be counted as cognitive were it performed by
an internal resource, then the external resource is just as much a part of the
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relevant cognitive system as the internal resource would be. Later arguments
for the extended cognition hypothesis, in contrast, appeal to the notion of com-
plementarity between internal and external resources, with Sutton (2010), for
example, maintaining that the distinct roles played by internal and external
resources are precisely what make the hypothesis plausible: the differences with
respect to storage format between engrams and exograms, in particular, enable
external memory to play roles that internal memory is ill-suited to play, thus
enabling subjects to perform cognitive tasks that they would otherwise be un-
able to perform, and satisfactory explanations of our cognitive performance will
therefore often treat cognition as extended.
Sutton builds here on his own earlier work (Sutton, 1998) on the distributed
character of engrams. This contrasts sharply with the local character of exo-
grams: whereas external memory traces (such as the entries in Otto’s notebook)
are typically discrete, stable, nonoverlapping entities carrying explicit content,
information storage in internal memory is, in Sutton’s view, blended, malleable,
superpositional, and implicit, roughly in the manner of connectionist networks.6
Targeting Sutton in particular, Hutto and Peeters reject this “second-wave” ex-
tended cognition just as resoundingly as they reject first-wave extended cogni-
tion, charging that
[d]espite acknowledging that the putative informational contents of
our memories are stored in quite different ways in biological memory,
as opposed to external devices, second wave extended mind theorists
remain committed to [the contrary of NC]. Thus, they remain com-
mitted to a content-based view of remembering to the extent that
they assume that there are contents to be stored at all—viz. to
the extent that they retain the idea that remembering essentially
involves receiving, encoding, and retrieving stored contentful infor-
mation about particular events or episodes. (2018, 103)
It thus becomes evident that their concern is not with storage format but rather
with the idea of storage as such: on their view, content is stored neither in
Otto’s notebook nor in Inga’s brain, regardless of whether these share a common
format.
Given the kinds of contents putatively stored in Otto’s notebook and the role
that these are said to play in his cognitive life, Clark and Chalmers’ thought
experiment, to the extent that it is about memory, concerns semantic memory
in particular. Hutto and Peeters’ discussion, however, makes clear that they
mean to endorse not just NC-semantic but also NC-episodic and NC-procedural:
regardless of the kind of memory at issue, in other words, memory traces are not
contentful.7 Having determined that what is at stake in NC is the very idea of
stored content, we can set the question of the extended character of remembering
aside (though we will need to briefly come back to extended cognition below).
If we endorse NC, then we can (if Hutto and Peeters are right) endorse the
6See Robins 2016b for detailed discussion of the relationship between connectionist net-
works and networks of the kind thought to be involved in memory.
7In order to avoid terminological confusion, we note that, while Hutto and Peeters (like
Perrin 2018; see section 4) would prefer not to refer to memory traces at all, this is because
they take it a contentful conception of traces for granted; they would presumably be willing
to refer to traces on the condition that these are understood in line with the contentless
conception outlined below.
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extended cognition hypothesis, adopting a version of the hypothesis on which
neither internal nor external memory deals in stored content. If we reject NC,
then we can (pace Adams and Aizawa 2008 and others who have posited a
difference between “intrinsic” internal content and “derived” external content)
likewise endorse the extended cognition hypothesis, adopting a version of the
hypothesis on which both internal and external memory deal in stored content.
Extended cognition, in other words, does not drive a wedge between radical
enactivism about memory and mainstream theories of memory—mainstream
theories are compatible with the first key feature of radical enactivism about
memory.
The motivations for the remaining two key features of the account—its em-
phasis on the reconstructive character of remembering, and NC itself—are inter-
twined with the distributed conception of (internal) memory traces introduced
above. Part of Hutto and Peeters’ motivation for rejecting a conception of
memory traces as contentful stems from their commitment to the broader radi-
cal enactivist project of accounting for as much of cognition as possible without
reference to content.8 But their rejection of the contentful conception of traces
is also motivated more specifically by their perception of the greater faithfulness
of a contentless conception to the relevant science. Thus they approvingly cite
De Brigard’s take on the empirical literature:9
“Storing” is a rather misleading term. What seems to occur when we
encode information is the strengthening of neural connections due
to the co-activation of different regions of the brain [. . . ]. A memory
trace is the dispositional property these regions have to re-activate,
when triggered by the right cue, in roughly the same pattern of
activation they underwent during encoding. (2014, 169)
We may, if De Brigard (as interpreted by Hutto and Peeters) is right, continue
to refer to “memory traces”, on the condition that these are not understood
as being “commodities”—items that might in principle be encoded, stored and
retrieved. Traces are, instead, to be understood as being dispositions of a larger
network. While it may be useful to retain the vocabulary of encoding, storage,
and retrieval in order to have distinct labels for distinct stages of the memory
process, remembering, strictly speaking, does not involve the storage of content.
“Encoding” refers, instead, to the creation of a disposition, with “retrieval”
referring to the activation of the disposition and “storage” referring to the period
in between encoding and retrieval, during which the disposition is inactive.10
8This project is motivated, in turn, by the claims, first, that there is no naturalistically
respectable account of content available (the so-called “hard problem of content”) and, second,
that eliminating reference to content in cognitive science does not result in loss of explanatory
power (Hutto and Myin, 2013, 2017).
9The literature in question is voluminous, and we will not attempt to duplicate De Brigard’s
summary and interpretation of it here.
10One might object here that a disposition to produce a certain content is naturally viewed
as carrying that content. While it is not our aim here to defend Hutto and Peeters’ move from
the distributed conception to the contentless conception, we note that the obvious response to
this objection is to point out that the issue is about storage of content and that a disposition
is simply not the sort of entity that might store content. One might further object that
the notion of a contentless trace is unintuitive and that a much more detailed statement
of the contentless conception is required before radical enactivism about memory can be
properly assessed. While our project here, which is concerned with the relationships among
existing theories rather than with developing those theories in further detail, does not require
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There is a clear echo here of Sutton’s distributed conception of traces, which
similarly understands traces in terms of modifications of the strengths of con-
nections among nodes in a network. The overall relationship between the dis-
tributed conception and the contentless conception is not, however, immediately
clear, as Sutton treats traces as having (implicit) content. We come back to this
relationship below. The point to note, for the moment, is that the contentless
conception, on which, regardless of whether they originate in contentful states
(at encoding) or result in contentful states (at retrieval), traces are not them-
selves contentful, is meant to respect what the sciences of memory have revealed
about the workings of the memory process.
3.1 Procedural memory without content
De Brigard’s argument for the contentless conception is persuasive—and we will
accordingly refer to “encoding”, “storage”, and “retrieval” without presuming
that content is literally encoded, stored, and retrieved—but it is not immedi-
ately obvious whether, if we adopt that conception, we can account for all forms
of remembering. Hutto and Peeters’ argument to the effect that we can gets
under way with an attempt to establish NC-procedural. This portion of their
argument is relatively straightforward, and we will not spend any time reviewing
it here. “Radical” rhetoric notwithstanding, NC-procedural is not a particularly
surprising claim: there is little temptation to suppose that procedural remem-
bering involves the retrieval of stored content, simply because the outputs of
procedural remembering (actions of various sorts) do not themselves appear
to be contentful, and most philosophers of memory thus arguably endorse the
claim.
Michaelian’s (2016b) simulation theory of episodic memory, for example, is
singled out by Hutto and Peeters as being incompatible with radical enactivism,
but Michaelian himself argues that the noninvolvement of stored content in pro-
cedural remembering marks a difference in kind, within the broad category of
memory, between (contentless) procedural memory and (contentful) declarative
memory. There are important differences between the simulation theory and
the causal theory, but none that would prevent a causal theorist from running
the same argument. This argument would, of course, appear to be incompatible
with NC-semantic and NC-episodic. We argue in section 5 that the argument
can easily be reworked so as to remove any incompatibility, but what matters,
at this stage of the dialectic, is that there is no reason to suspect any incompat-
ibility between radical enactivism about memory and mainstream philosophical
theories of memory with respect to procedural memory: while there are oc-
casional references to “procedural information” in the psychological literature
(see Michaelian 2016b), mainstream philosophical theories of memory can adopt
NC-procedural. The question of the compatibility of radical enactivism about
memory and mainstream theories of memory thus turns on NC-semantic and
NC-episodic.
us to undertake this, we acknowledge that radical enactivists (and procedural causal and
nontransmissionist simulation theorists; see section 4) will eventually need to develop the
contentless conception in more detail.
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3.2 Semantic memory without content
In order to argue for NC-semantic, Hutto and Peeters turn back to Clark and
Chalmers’ thought experiment. Otto, in their view, forms a contentful semantic
memory despite the fact that he retrieves no content from his external memory.
Inga, they suggest, likewise forms a contentful semantic memory despite the fact
that she retrieves no content from her internal memory. It is not entirely clear
how the transition from Otto’s contentless external memory “store” to his con-
tentful “retrieved” memory is supposed to be made, but this need not concern
us here. The transition from Inga’s contentless internal memory store to her
contentful retrieved memory is, it appears, supposed to be made in line with De
Brigard’s story: We begin with the coactivation of brain regions, underwriting a
contentful state. This leads (through the process of encoding) to the creation of
a disposition (storage). When activated by an appropriate cue, the disposition
leads to the coactivation of brain regions similar to the previous coactivation,
underwriting a contentful state similar to previous state (retrieval). This story
raises a pair of worries. First, assuming that semantic thoughts and memories
are indeed contentful states, it is not clear what process is supposed to take
us from a contentful state (the initial semantic thought) to a contentless state
(the encoded memory) and back to a contentful state (the retrieved memory).
Second, it is not in fact clear whether semantic memories are meant to be under-
stood as being contentful in their own right or whether they are instead meant
to be understood as acquiring content only when combined with some further
factor. In the case of episodic memory, as we will see, the suggestion seems
to be that the products of retrieval are not contentful in their own right but
acquire content only when the subject is in possession of certain sociocultural
practices (Hutto and Peeters 2018, 110; see also Hutto and Myin 2017, ch. 9
and Hutto 2017). It would thus not be surprising if Hutto and Peeter’s view
entailed that the products of semantic retrieval are not themselves contentful
but acquire content only in certain sociocultural contexts.
While this aspect of their view is not entirely clear, we set it aside for the
moment, as we come back to NC-semantic in section 5. The important point,
for present purposes, is that, regardless of the details, Hutto and Peeters seem
to accept the claim that in semantic memory we ultimately arrive at a contenful
state. Thus, rather than offering an explicit assessment of Hutto and Peeters’
account of semantic remembering at this stage, we will turn directly to their
account of episodic remembering. It would, given that semantic memory and
episodic memory are both forms of declarative memory, be surprising if NC-
semantic were true but not NC-episodic or vice versa—it is difficult to imagine
a coherent overall account on which episodic remembering does not involve the
retrieval of stored content while semantic remembering does or on which seman-
tic remembering does not involve the retrieval of stored content while episodic
remembering does. Admittedly, the precise relationship between episodic mem-
ory and semantic memory is not entirely clear. On some views, there may be
a single declarative memory system responsible for both episodic and seman-
tic memory. Klein (2015), for example, has argued that episodic and semantic
memory both involve retrieval of the same sort of content and are distinguished
primarily by their respective phenomenologies. On other views, episodic and
semantic memory may amount to distinct systems. But even on views of the
latter sort, episodic and semantic memory interact in a direct manner. Auto-
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biographical memory, for example, does not, on most accounts, correspond to
a distinct system but is rather a complex capacity requiring the integration of
episodic memories of specific events with more general semantic memories of life
stages. Given a view of either sort, then, it would appear not to be workable to
conjoin a contentless view of one kind of memory with a contentful view of the
other.
Anticipating our discussion of episodic memory below, one might worry that,
while it is relatively natural to view episodic memory as a form of imagination,
it is much less natural to view semantic memory as a form of imagination and
that, in view of this difference between the two forms of memory, it would not
be surprising were there to turn out to be a difference with respect to storage of
content between episodic and semantic memory. In response to this worry, we
point out that, while it may indeed be less natural to view semantic memory as
a form of imagination, semantic remembering may nevertheless turn out to have
an imaginative character. Michaelian (2018), for example, builds on views (e.g.,
Goldman 2006; see Arcangeli 201x for discussion) on which both semantic imag-
ination (also referred to as suppositional imagination) and episodic imagination
(also referred to as enactment imagination) are both a matter of simulating
mental states to argue that it may ultimately be possible to extend the simu-
lation theory from episodic to semantic memory. Klein (2015), too, though he
singles episodic memory out as having a special status (see section 5), posits
a fundamental similarity between episodic and semantic memory, arguing that
the difference between them is purely phenomenological; this similarly suggests
that, if we are entitled to describe episodic memory as a form of imagination,
we are likewise entitled to describe semantic memory as a form of imagina-
tion. Of course, the availability of these views does not settle the matter, and
one might reinforce the worry by noting that, while the relationship between
episodic memory and imagination has been established by research on episodic
memory as a form of mental time travel tightly linked episodic future thought
(Perrin and Michaelian, 2017; Sant’Anna, 2018), no similar link between seman-
tic memory and an analogous future-oriented capacity has been established. In
response, we point out that, while most research on memory as a form of mental
time travel so far has focused on episodic memory and episodic future thought,
there is increasing emphasis on the role of semantic memory in future-oriented
mental time travel (Irish, 2016) and indeed on properly semantic forms of future-
oriented thought (Klein et al., 2002; Szpunar et al., 2016). These considerations
do not conclusively establish that episodic memory and semantic memory do not
differ significantly with respect to their relationship to imagination, but they do
suggest that it is reasonable to suppose that NC-episodic and NC-semantic will
stand or fall together.
3.3 Episodic memory without content
Turning to NC-episodic, Hutto and Peeters emphasize that, in line with empir-
ical research on memory as a form of mental time travel, recent philosophical
theories treat episodic remembering as a thoroughly reconstructive process, a
matter of imagining or simulating past events. Such theories, they note, might
appear to pose a problem for radical enactivism about memory: “It might be
thought that if episodic memory just is, or centrally involves, simulative imag-
ining then it must be representational. [. . . ] [I]magining, by its very nature,
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deals with presence in absence. If all imagining is necessarily representational
then defeat for radically enactive accounts of imagination and memory follows
briskly” (2018, 110–111). The basic thought here is straightforward—if radi-
cal enactivism is committed to the claim that retrieved episodic memories do
not have representational content, while an understanding of episodic memory
as a form of imagination is bound to imply that retrieved episodic memories
do have representational content, then radical enactivism cannot accommodate
such an understanding of episodic memory—but it is nonetheless puzzling that
Hutto and Peeters take this to be the decisive point, for their argument oth-
erwise focuses on the presence of content during storage, not after retrieval:
NC-episodic, as we have interpreted it, denies that episodic remembering in-
volves the retrieval of stored content, since it denies that traces are contentful,
but—bearing in mind that “retrieval” need not literally be a matter of retriev-
ing content—this does not by itself imply that retrieved episodic memories are
themselves contentless, since the states produced by retrieval might be imbued
with content through the involvement of some other factor.
If this is right, then there need be no tension between radical enactivism
about memory and an understanding of memory as a form of imagination, even
if we grant that imagination produces contentful states. Consider the view
defended recently by Sant’Anna and Michaelian (201x), who, building on an-
tirepresentationalist views of perception (e.g., Travis 2004; Genone 2014), argue
that various forms of episodic thought, including episodic memory and episodic
imagination, are “silent” in the sense that they do not by themselves establish
accuracy conditions and thus do not have content. On the view in question,
content is acquired only through the “habits of action” that accompany the
production of episodic thoughts, which include, in particular, “habits of judg-
ing” certain things to be the case about the episodes that are their objects.
Moreover, because they argue that “genuinely remembering an event does not
require the preservation of a trace connecting the actual memory to a previ-
ous perceptual state” (Sant’Anna and Michaelian 201x, 23), their view suggests
that, even if remembering does not involve the retrieval of stored content, it is
possible for retrieved memories to be imbued with content by other means.
Hutto and Peeters seem to hint at a similar view when they say that episodic
memory judgements can have content, even if they deny that retrieved episodic
memories themselves have content. While the details of their view are not en-
tirely clear, the basic idea is that contentful judgements about an episode arise
only with the mastery of narrative practices. Appealing to recent developments
in developmental psychology, Hutto (2017; see also Hutto and Myin 2017, ch. 9)
argues that the capacity to take a given episodic thought of an event to stand
for—that is, to contentfully represent—a particular past event is a capacity
that starts to develop only after the age of three, when children begin to engage
in narrative constructions regarding past and future events with their parents.
Studies suggest that it is only when these abilities are quite well-developed that
we learn to associate episodic thoughts with our personal pasts (Nelson and
Fivush 2004; Fivush and Nelson 2004; Hoerl 2007; Fivush 2011). Thus it seems
that, on the radical enactivist view as well as Sant’Anna and Michaelian’s view,
episodic retrieval can be seen as involving a transition from a contentless to a
contentful state, even if the production of the contentful state is an additional
step. In short, contrary to the suggestion made by Hutto and Peeters, it does
not seem to be the case that “[i]f all imagining is necessarily representational
11
then defeat for radically enactive accounts of imagination and memory follows
briskly” (2018, 110–111); the important question is, rather, whether remember-
ing involves retrieval of stored content.
We will thus continue to take it that the core claim of radical enactivism
with respect to episodic memory is NC-episodic, interpreted as we have been
interpreting it so far: (episodic) memory traces are not contentful. Now, we
have seen that Hutto and Peeters have two basic motivations for adopting a
contentless conception of traces. First, they follow De Brigard (2014) in taking
it to be required by considerations of empirical adequacy. Second, of course,
such a conception fits nicely with the general antirepresentationalist thrust of
radical enactivist theory. Recent causal and postcausal theorists have focused
heavily on the philosophical implications of empirical research on reconstructive,
simulative, or imaginative remembering and will be sympathetic to the former
motivation. They will not necessarily be particularly sympathetic to the latter—
while there have been occasional displays of hostility to accounts of memory as
a representational capacity, these have for the most part been motivated by
fairly traditional arguments for direct realism or relationalism, rather than by
anything like enactivist antirepresentationalism (Debus, 2008). Nevertheless,
philosophers of memory have increasingly arrived at the same conclusion as
Hutto and Peeters, albeit by a different route, adopting a contentless conception
of traces not because they wish to dispense with content as such but rather
because the widely-adopted distributed conception of traces has come to seem,
when properly understood, to lead inexorably to the contentless conception. In
the following section, we retrace the route they have taken, demonstrating, in
the process, that an important subset of recent theories are compatible with the
core features of radical enactivism about memory.
4 Contentless memory traces and (post)causal
theories of memory
There are a few contemporary defenders of epistemic (James, 2017) and even
empiricist (Byrne, 2010) theories of memory, but the overwhelming majority of
philosophers of memory today endorse theories that recognizably descend from
the causal theory of memory as formulated by Martin and Deutscher (Debus,
2017). It is on a subset of these that we focus here.
4.1 The (neo)classical causal theory
Perhaps the chief task of a philosophical theory of memory is to provide a general
account of the features that distinguish remembering from other memory-like
processes, including imagining. According to Martin and Deutscher’s (1966)
version of the causal theory—what Michaelian and Robins (2018) refer to as the
“classical” causal theory—remembering is distinguished from mere imagining
by the presence, in the case of remembering, and the absence, in the case of
imagining, of an appropriate causal connection between a retrieved putative
memory of an event and the remembering subject’s earlier experience of that
event. A causal connection, in turn, is taken to be “appropriate” just in case
it is sustained by a memory trace originating in the subject’s experience of the
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event. And a memory trace is assumed to be a contentful entity the content of
which derives from the relevant experience.
The details of Martin and Deutscher’s own account of the nature of the con-
tent of memory traces—their account, which compares memory traces to the
grooves of a record, is emphatically local, in the sense introduced in section 3—
have not had much of an impact (see Robins 2017). Their general assumption
that traces have content—of some sort—was, however, until recently taken for
granted by most philosophers of memory. Bernecker, for example, in developing
his “neoclassical” (Michaelian and Robins, 2018) version of the causal theory,
follows Sutton in rejecting Martin and Deutscher’s local account and adopting
a connectionist-inspired distributed view of traces. Like Sutton, he argues that
remembering does not involve the retrieval of discrete traces stored in discrete lo-
cations: “information is stored in the strengths of connections between neurons.
. . . [T]races are distributed rather than local: what can be distinctly remem-
bered need not be held distinctly or independently, since each memory item is
spread or ‘superposed’ across many elements in a neural network” (2010, 137).
He continues, however, to take for granted that traces are contentful, asking:
“[w]hat are the mechanisms by which traces store content?” (2010, 133).
Martin and Deutscher’s influence continues to be felt here, not only in the
explicit assumption that traces are contentful but also, arguably, in an implicit
assumption that, while storage is distributed, content is in some sense local.
(“Memory items” are distributed across multiple elements in a network, but
they remain items.) This combination of views—storage format as distributed
and stored content as local—is not unique to Bernecker, and we will return
to it below. For now, we note that the (neo)classical causal theory is highly
intuitive, encapsulating a natural picture of remembering on which it amounts
to the transmission of content from experience to retrieved memory via the in-
termediary of a contentful memory trace. It is also, whatever its other merits,
straightforwardly incompatible with NC-episodic and thus with radical enac-
tivism about memory. We will therefore set it aside in the remainder of this
paper.11
4.2 The simulation theory
Michaelian (2016b), in developing the simulation theory, positions himself in op-
position to the causal theory, denying that appropriate causation is necessary for
the occurrence of genuine remembering; the simulation theory can thus be seen
as a postcausal theory (Michaelian and Robins, 2018).12 The positive argument
for the simulation theory—negative arguments are discussed below—builds on
research on memory as a form of mental time travel analogous to episodic future
thought,13 research that suggests that the process of remembering the past is
executed by the same system as the process of imagining the future and, indeed,
that carrying out the latter process may be the primary function of the system.
11Just as we do not aim to assess the viability of radical enactivism, we do not aim to assess
that of the causal theory or the other theories of memory discussed below.
12Shanton and Goldman (2010) and De Brigard (2014) defend simulationist accounts of
remembering but, unlike Michaelian, do not explicitly deal with the question of the necessity
of appropriate causation. In addition to the simulation theory, the category of postcausal
theories includes Ferna´ndez’ (2018) functionalist theory and, arguably, James’ (2017) version
of the epistemic theory.
13See Perrin and Michaelian 2017 and Sant’Anna 2018 for reviews.
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Since imagining a future event trivially does not presuppose the existence of a
causal connection between the subject’s thought of the event and his experi-
ence of the event, this, in turn, suggests that remembering a past event likewise
should not be taken to presuppose the existence of a causal connection between
the subject’s thought of the event and his experience of the event: the episodic
memory system (which is perhaps in fact an “episodic construction system”;
Michaelian 2016b) appears simply not to be designed in such a way that the
presence of such a connection can be taken for granted in every case of genuine
remembering. The simulation theory thus maintains that previous efforts to
identify the features that distinguish remembering from mere imagining were
misguided: according to the simulation theory, to remember the past just is to
imagine it.14
Like radical enactivism, the simulation theory is motivated by an appreci-
ation of the reconstructive character of remembering and denies that remem-
bering necessarily involves the transmission of content from an experience of an
event to a retrieved memory of the event. One might therefore expect it, un-
like the (neo)classical causal theory, to be compatible with NC-episodic. Unlike
radical enactivism, however, the simulation theory is not motivated by hostility
to the idea of stored content. In fact, while the simulation theory denies that
any content needs to be transmitted from an experience of an event to a later
apparent memory of the event in order for the apparent memory to qualify as
a genuine memory, it does not deny that retrieval draws on contentful memory
traces. On the contrary, the simulation theorist argues that, just as imagining a
future event is a constructive process that draws on stored content originating
in the subject’s experiences of various events, remembering a past event is a
reconstructive process that draws on stored content originating in the subject’s
experiences of various events. A retrieved memory of a given event will often—
indeed usually—include retrieved content originating in the subject’s experience
of the remembered event but will normally also include content originating in
the subject’s experiences of other events, and, in some cases, a retrieved memory
of a given event will include only content originating in the subject’s experiences
of other events, i.e., it will include no content originating in the subject’s expe-
rience of the remembered event. In both kinds of case, the simulation theory
asserts that episodic remembering involves the retrieval of stored content.
Thus, while the simulation theory is compatible with the second key fea-
ture of radical enactivism about memory (its emphasis on the reconstructive
character of remembering), it is incompatible with its third key feature (NC),
and Hutto and Peeters therefore take the simulation theory to be, like the
(neo)classical causal theory, incompatible with their account, singling out the
following passage as illustrative of the simulation theorist’s commitment to the
contrary of NC-episodic.
Declarative memories are available to consciousness and thus can
affect the activities of other cognitive systems. I remember that it
has been sunny every day for the past week; I infer that it will be
14This argument takes the mental time travel framework for granted and, moreover, rests on
a “continuist” interpretation of that framework according to which it implies that, aside from
their different temporal orientations, there is no difference in kind between episodic memory
and episodic future thought. For alternative “discontinuist” interpretations of the mental time
travel framework, see Perrin 2016 and Dokic and Arcangeli 2018. For an argument against
the framework itself, see Mahr and Csibra 2018.
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sunny today; I therefore leave home without bringing an umbrella.
An appeal to stored information is essential to the explanation of
my behaviour in this case, for the memory does not cause the be-
haviour directly, but only via an intermediate process of reasoning.
Conscious access to stored contents allows them to enter into the
causation of behaviour in various indirect ways, via reasoning, imag-
ination, and other routes; if the subject were not to have such access,
declarative memory would be unable to provide inputs to other pro-
cesses. Thus, were we to suppose that declarative memory does not
store information, we would be unable to explain certain modifica-
tions in the behaviour of the organism. (Michaelian 2016b, 27–28;
Hutto and Peeters’ emphases)
We will come back to this passage in section 5. But we first want to show,
in the remainder of section 4, that, appearances to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, the simulation theory can easily be made compatible with NC-episodic, in
the sense that the simulation theorist can say everything that he needs to say
without any reference to stored content. We will show, moreover, that there
is pressure for the simulation theorist to do so from within the community of
causal and postcausal theories, for reasons independent of the sort of general
antirepresentationalist considerations emphasized by radical enactivists.
One might wonder whether our argument is undermined by a discrepancy
between the notion of content with which radical enactivists work and the no-
tion with which philosophers of memory work. Radical enactivists understand
content in semantic terms, that is, as being that in virtue of which a memory
would stand for or be about something in the world. Philosophers of memory,
in contrast, arguably understand it in componential terms (Perrin 2018), that
is, as pertaining to the elements or building blocks in virtue of which a memory
is experienced in a certain way; the idea is that if, for example, one remembers
one’s birthday party last year, one’s memory will include various bits of infor-
mation, such as “cake”, “people”, and “drinks”, which determine, at least in
part, how one experiences the memory. It is not entirely clear whether the fact
that memory has content in the componential sense entails that it has content
in the semantic sense. If it does, this would simply reinforce the argument for
the negative claim that the classical causal theory and the simulation theory
are not compatible with radical enactivism about memory. If it does not, this
would undermine at most that argument; it would not undermine the argu-
ment, developed in the remainder of this section, for the positive claim that the
procedural causal theory and a “nontransmissionist” version of the simulation
theory are compatible with radical enactivism about memory: if the view that
memory involves the storage and retrieval of content, as that view figures in
the classical causal theory and the simulation theory, refers to content in the
componential sense, then, because the fact that a given process involves com-
ponential content does not entail that it involves semantic content, the classical
causal theory and the simulation theory might turn out be compatible with rad-
ical enactivism after all, just as—we argue below—the procedural causal theory
and the nontransmissionist simulation theory are compatible with radical en-
activism. Because the truth of the claim that the classical causal theory and
the simulation theory are compatible with radical enactivism turns on the pre-
cise relationship between componential content and semantic content, we will
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not attempt to defend it here. The claim that the procedural causal theory
and the nontransmissionist simulation theory are compatible with radical en-
activism about memory does not depend on this relationship, as both of the
theories in question deny that remembering involves the storage and retrieval of
either componential or semantic content; it is this claim that we defend in the
remainder of the section.
4.3 The procedural causal theory
Martin and Deutscher, we noted above, worked with a conception of traces as
local and contentful. Their version of the causal theory has been enormously
influential, but Sutton’s (1998 and subsequent) arguments for the distributed
conception of traces have convinced most (post)causal theorists to abandon the
local conception. These theorists have, however, been slow to recognize that the
distributed conception of traces may be in tension with the contentful conception
of traces.15
One illustration of the failure to recognize this tension is provided by Ber-
necker’s neoclassical causal theory, which, we have seen, combines the claim that
remembering involves the storage of content with the claim that the format in
which that content is stored is distributed. Another illustration is provided by
a version of the causal theory previously defended by Michaelian.16 In order to
account for the reconstructive character of remembering, including the fact that
retrieved representations routinely include content not included in the content
of the corresponding earlier experiences, Michaelian (2011) combines a causal
theory similar to Martin and Deutscher’s with Sutton’s distributed conception
of traces. The resulting “constructive causal theory” continues to take the
contentful conception of traces for granted, treating storage as distributed but
content as effectively local. The constructive causal theory thus operates with
a “componential” understanding of causation (Perrin, 2018), an understanding
on which the causal link (allegedly) necessary for the occurrence of genuine re-
membering is to be analyzed in terms of the transmission of discrete “packets”
of content from experience to retrieved representation. The packets of content
left behind by experience can, in Michaelian’s view, be shaped during encoding
and consolidation, modified by ongoing experience during reconsolidation, and
transformed and recombined in various ways during retrieval, thus accounting
for a range of aspects of reconstruction. But experience is still seen as leaving
behind discrete contents that can be transmitted, in one form or another, to re-
trieved memories. This goes as well for the simulation theory, which denies that
remembering a given event presupposes the transmission of content from expe-
rience of the particular event remembered but continues to treat remembering
as involving the transmission of content from experience in general.
That the package of views that Bernecker and Michaelian each offers us—
combining the distributed conception of traces with the contentful conception—
may be incoherent has recently started to become clear. Perrin (2018), in partic-
15This slowness may be due to a failure on the part of philosophers of memory to take older
debates over the storage of content in connectionist networks—in which some (e.g., Ramsey
et al. 1990) argued that the lack of storage of explicit content in such networks meant that
they simply did not store content, while others (e.g., O’Brien 1991) argued that they might
nevertheless store implicit content—into account.
16See Robins 2016a for a recent approach in the same general spirit.
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ular, has argued that, once we adopt the distributed conception, we are bound
to abandon the componential understanding of causation in memory in favour
of an alternative “procedural” understanding in line with De Brigard’s charac-
terization of traces as dispositions. In order to illustrate the nature of the causal
link that may obtain between a (contentful) retrieved memory and a (content-
ful) earlier experience even in the absence of stored content, Perrin offers the
following metaphor.
Let’s imagine you have two copies of one and the same puzzle. The
pieces are exactly the same in number, forms, and pictures in each
box. Obviously, however alike the pieces are, as one makes one of
the two puzzles one does not use the pieces of the other. In other
terms, the two series of construction operations apply respectively
to causally unrelated (though similar) bits of representation. But
at the same time . . . these construction operations themselves can
be causally related. For instance, if you make the two puzzles one
after the other, you will possibly perform the second time better
than the first time. And should you repeat the operations further,
the enhancement will probably get ever clearer. So arguably, an ear-
lier series of construction operations can get a later series enhanced,
while the manipulated sets of pieces are distinct and causally unre-
lated. (2018, 37)
The basic idea is that, if (in line with views such as that of O’Regan and Noe¨
2001) we think of perceiving as a constructive process, and if (in line with
research on mental time travel) we think of remembering as a reconstructive
process, then we can acknowledge that the latter process is (when genuine re-
membering occurs) causally dependent on the former process—for example, in
that it manifests greater fluency—despite the fact that no component of the rep-
resentation constructed during perception is transmitted to the representation
reconstructed during retrieval.17
Perrin claims not just that we can account for causation in the absence of the
transmission of content but also that, given the distributed conception of traces,
we must do so. We noted in section 3 that the relationship between Sutton’s
distributed conception of traces and the contentless conception that Hutto and
Peeters find in De Brigard was not entirely clear. Perrin’s procedural causal
theory, which claims that appropriate causation is necessary for the occurrence
of genuine remembering but understands causation in procedural rather than
componential terms, helps to clarify the matter. What Perrin argues is that the
distributed conception must be understood as a purely dispositional conception
and hence as necessitating the contentless conception: if the laying down of
a memory traces amounts simply to the modification of the strengths of con-
nections among nodes in a network, then all there is, between encoding and
retrieval, is a disposition to produce a representation with a certain content;
and if all there is is a disposition to produce a representation with a certain
content, then, strictly speaking, no content is stored.
17One might worry here that the puzzle analogy allows the procedural causal theorist to
smuggle into his account the very (componential) content that he rejects (in the form of the
puzzle pieces). The procedural causal theorist would presumably argue, in response, that the
components of the content of the retrieved representation are generated at the time of retrieval
by the reactivation of areas that were activated during experience.
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The procedural causal theorist adopts the distributed conception of traces
and therefore adopts the contentless conception. The neoclassical and construc-
tive variants of the causal theory discussed above, as well as the simulation
theory, attempt to have things both ways by combining the distributed con-
ception with the contentful conception. If Perrin is right, this cannot be done.
Though Sutton himself has sometimes referred to distributed traces as having
“implicit” content, this is misleading at best. Distributed content is no con-
tent at all; the contentful conception in effect entails the local conception. The
neoclassical causal theory, the constructive causal theory, and the simulation
theory are, as far as the nature of memory traces is concerned, incoherent.
4.4 A nontransmissionist simulation theory
Assuming that Perrin is right, we might wonder why it took so long for this
incoherence to become apparent.18 The explanation appears to be, at least
in part, simply that the attention of (post)causal theorists has been directed
elsewhere. They have, in particular, been preoccupied with a debate between
views known as “preservationism” and “generationism”, a debate that has been
conducted in terms that have made it natural for defenders of both positions to
take a contentful conception of traces for granted.19 According to preservation-
ism (endorsed, e.g., by Bernecker 2010), it is incompatible with the occurrence
of genuine remembering that the content of the retrieved (apparent) memory
exceeds the content of the corresponding earlier experience. According to gen-
erationism (endorsed by Michaelian 2011 and 2016b and Perrin 2018), this is
not the case: memory can tell one more than one experienced, in the sense that
the content of a retrieved genuine memory of an event may sometimes exceed
the content of the subject’s experience of the event.
Preservationism is naturally described as the view that memory can only
“preserve” the content of experience. Consequently, it has been natural for gen-
erationists to argue for their view by adducing cases (e.g., boundary extension;
Intraub et al. 1992) in which memory appears not only to preserve the content
of experience but also to generate new content. The result is that both preserva-
tionists and generationists have ended up taking “transmissionism”—the claim
that content is transmitted from experience to retrieval via memory traces
(Michaelian and Robins, 2018)—for granted. The preservationism/generationism
and transmissionism/nontransmissionism distinctions are, however, orthogonal
to one another: the former pair of views pertains to the relationship between the
contents of the representations that exist at the beginning- and end-points of
the process of remembering, while the latter pertains to whether there is content
in play between these points (during storage). Thus one might coherently be
18In addition to Perrin (2018) and De Brigard (2014), Robins (2016b) and Cheng and
Werning (2016) have hinted at the necessity for a contentless conception of traces. Going
further back, there are few clear discussions of the issue, though Vosgerau (2010) does presage
recent developments in some respects.
19The preservationism/generationism debate is multifaceted, and “preservationism” and
“generationism” have been used to refer to a variety of pairs of views related to but distinct
from those discussed here. See, e.g., Ferna´ndez (2016) on whether episodic memory generates
(second-order) knowledge of the source of one’s (first-order) knowledge in past experience (cf.
Dokic 2014) and Lackey (2005) and Senor (2007) on whether memory generates knowledge
via the coming and going of defeaters. Frise (2017) and Bernecker and Grundmann (201x)
discuss additional varieties of preservationism/generationism.
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either a preservationist or a generationist while being either a transmissionist or
a nontransmissionist. Bernecker (2010), for example, combines transmissionism
with preservationism, while Michaelian (2011; 2016b) combines transmissionism
with generationism. Perrin (2018) endorses generationism but rejects transmis-
sionism in favour of nontransmissionism. Similarly, though it is not obvious how
this combination of views might be motivated, one might in principle combine
preservationism and nontransmissionism, maintaining that there is no content
in play during storage but that the occurrence of genuine remembering never-
theless requires that the content recreated at the time of retrieval not exceed
the content created at the time of perception.
Although Michaelian endorses transmissionism, the simulation theorist can
in fact follow the procedural causal theorist in rejecting transmissionism and
thereby endorsing the contentless conception of traces and NC-episodic. There
are two basic arguments for the simulation theory. The first is the positive
argument reviewed above. This argument appeals to the relationship between
remembering the past and imagining the future and makes no essential refer-
ence to the transmission of content. A nontransmissionist simulation theorist
would thus be able to run the argument without modification. The second, neg-
ative argument—really a pair of arguments—is designed to show that, contra
(neo)classical, constructive, and procedural causal theories, appropriate causa-
tion is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of genuine remember-
ing. These “anti-necessity” and “anti-sufficiency” arguments are conveniently
formulated in terms of the transmission of content, but they can be modified so
as to be made consistent with a nontransmissionist simulation theory.
Consider, first, the anti-sufficiency argument. Causal theorists of all stripes
maintain that, assuming that the earlier experience and the retrieved represen-
tation are both accurate with respect to the event, satisfaction of a condition
requiring the presence of an appropriate causal connection between a subject’s
retrieved representation and his earlier experience of an event is sufficient for the
retrieved representation to qualify as a memory of the event. A causal connec-
tion, again, is taken to be appropriate just in case it is sustained by a memory
trace originating in the subject’s experience of the event. Transmissionist causal
theorists understand the role played by the trace as being the transmission of
content from the earlier experience to the retrieved representation. The basic
idea of the anti-sufficiency argument, as formulated by the transmissionist sim-
ulation theorist, is that (in line with research on the reconstructive character
of remembering of the sort reviewed by Michaelian 2016b) contents originat-
ing in experiences of multiple earlier events may contribute to the content of a
single retrieved representation, whether because they make their way into the
trace resulting from the experience of the remembered event (during encod-
ing, consolidation, or reconsolidation) or because they result in distinct traces
that themselves, along with a trace originating in experience of the remem-
bered event, directly contribute content to the retrieved representation (during
retrieval). When this occurs, a single present representation is “appropriately”
causally connected to multiple earlier experiences. Together with the fact that
the retrieved representation might be accurate with respect to more than one of
the relevant events—consider, for example, a memory of an event of a type that
the subject has experienced many times—this implies that a single retrieved
representation might count as a memory of multiple earlier events. There may,
of course, be memories that refer to multiple events, but episodic memories, in
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particular, have a singular character, so we may bracket these here. The argu-
ment concludes that satisfaction of the appropriate causation condition is not
sufficient for the occurrence of genuine memory.
This argument can be reformulated in nontransmissionist terms. Nontrans-
missionist causal theorists understand the role played by the trace as being
a matter of sustaining a disposition to produce a content similar to that of
the experience of the remembered event when given a suitable cue. The basic
idea of the anti-sufficiency argument, as formulated by the nontransmissionist
simulation theorist, is, again, that a single retrieved representation might be
“appropriately” causally connected to multiple earlier experiences. Given that
a trace is not an entity but rather a disposition underwritten by connection
strengths among nodes in a network, there will not normally be a one-to-one
correspondence between experiences and traces. Instead, multiple experiences
are normally responsible for the strength and continuing existence of a given dis-
position, as connection strengths are reinforced and weakened during encoding,
consolidation, and reconsolidation. Consider, again, the workings of connection-
ist networks: in virtue of the connection strengths among its nodes, a network
can be said to have a disposition to produce a certain output (corresponding to
retrieval) when given a certain input (corresponding to the retrieval cue), but
these connection strengths are the product of multiple training sessions (corre-
sponding to multiple experiences). If there is not a one-to-one correspondence
between experiences and traces, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence
between retrieved representations and experiences, implying that a single re-
trieved representation will sometimes be “appropriately” causally connected to
multiple earlier experiences. As before, this leads quickly to the conclusion
that satisfaction of the appropriate causation condition is not sufficient for the
occurrence of genuine memory.20
Turning to the anti-necessity argument, causal theorists maintain that satis-
faction of the appropriate causation condition is necessary for a retrieved repre-
sentation to qualify as a genuine memory of the apparently remembered event.
The basic idea of the anti-necessity argument, as formulated by the transmis-
sionist simulation theorist, is that the reconstructive character of remembering
suggests that, even when the memory (or episodic construction) system func-
tions exactly as it should, the content of a retrieved representation need not be
20A comparison of the transmissionist and nontransmissionist versions of the anti-sufficiency
argument suggests two observations. The first is that distributed and procedural causal theo-
rists have yet to really offer an account of appropriate causation. Given the local conception
of traces, there might in principle be a one-to-one correspondence between traces and ex-
periences, even if, in practice, there is always always a one-to-many correspondence. Given
the distributed conception, in contrast, there is a one-to-many correspondence virtually by
definition. The second is that, while the one-to-many correspondence between traces and expe-
riences ensures that the the nontransmissionist simulationist can come to the same conclusion
as the transmissionist simulationist regarding the insufficiency of appropriate causation, the
structure of the nontransmissionist anti-sufficiency argument does not precisely mirror that
of the transmissionist anti-sufficiency argument. The latter turns on the claim that distinct
contents originating in experiences of distinct events can make their way into a single retrieved
memory. The former replaces this claim with the claim that retrieval of a single memory can
be treated as the activation of a disposition originating in experiences of distinct events. In
order for the nontransmissionist argument to mirror the transmissionist argument, it would
need, instead, to appeal to the claim that retrieval of a single memory can be treated as the
activation of distinct dispositions originating in experiences of distinct events. Whether this
claim is coherent cannot be determined without a more detailed discussion of the nature of
the relevant dispositions than we can feasibly undertake here.
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transmitted, even in part, from the content of the relevant earlier experience.
Reconstruction during encoding, consolidation, reconsolidation, and retrieval
implies that the content of a retrieved representation will never or essentially
never be transmitted exclusively from the content of a single experience. In
some cases, a majority of the content may be so transmitted, but, in some
cases, only a minority may be so transmitted. Given that the same reconstruc-
tive process is at work both when a majority of the content of the retrieved
representation is transmitted from the content of the experience of the appar-
ently remembered event and when a minority of the content of the retrieved
representation is transmitted from the content of the apparently remembered
event, the simulation theorist invites us to conclude that the subject is genuinely
remembering in both cases. He then invites us to go one step further: given
what we know about how the memory (or episodic construction) system works,
we have to assume that the same reconstructive process may be at work even
when none of the content of the retrieved representation is transmitted from
the content of the experience of the apparently remembered event. And this
suggests that a retrieved representation may qualify as a genuine memory of
the apparently remembered event even when no content at all is transmitted
from experience to retrieval. If this is right, then satisfaction of the appropriate
causation condition (understood in transmissionist terms) is not necessary for
memory.
This argument, too, can be reformulated in nontransmissionist terms. We
have already seen that, given nontransmissionism, there cannot be a one-to-one
correspondence between experiences and traces, simply because the dispositions
that are traces are not in general the products of single experiences. This means
that there will normally be a causal connection of the relevant sort not just
between a given retrieved representation and a single earlier experience but also
between that representation and other experiences. In some cases, few other
experiences may contribute to shaping the disposition, but, in other cases, the
contribution of the experience of the relevant event may be dwarfed by the
contributions of other experiences—again, consider a memory for an event of a
type that the subject has experienced many times. Given that the same process
is at work in cases of both sorts, we should say that genuine memory occurs in
cases of both sorts. Now, it may be that, given the distributed conception of
traces, there is almost always a causal connection of the relevant sort between
any given retrieved representation and any given earlier experience. It is to be
expected, however, that there are cases in which there is no causal connection
between a given representation and a given earlier experience—this may, for
example, occur when the encoding is interrupted for one reason or another.21
And this means that it is to be expected that there are cases in which the
experience of the relevant event makes no contribution at all to the shaping
of the disposition responsible for the production of a retrieved representation.
Given what we know about the reconstructive workings of the memory system,
we have to assume that the same process may be at work even in cases of
this sort. As before, this brings us to the conclusion that satisfaction of the
appropriate causation condition (now understood in nontransmissionist terms)
is not necessary for memory.
21If we deny the possibility of such cases, insisting that there is always a causal connection,
then the necessity condition collapses into triviality.
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If he is to avoid the implication that any imagining of an event whatsoever
qualifies as a memory of the event, the simulation theorist will need to provide
a substitute of some sort for the appropriate causation condition. Michaelian
(2016b) has argued that a reliability condition—which might be satisfied even
when the causal condition is not—enables us to distinguish between genuine
memory and instances of merely apparent memory such as misremembering
and confabulation. The suitability of a reliability condition has, unsurprisingly,
been challenged by defenders of the causal theory such as Robins (201xa; 201xb)
and Bernecker (2017),22 but this debate need not concern us here, as our aim
is not to assess the viability of the simulation theory but rather to determine
whether the simulation theorist’s arguments are compatible with nontransmis-
sionism. And we have seen that, while the anti-necessity and anti-sufficiency
arguments are conveniently formulated in terms of the transmission of content,
they can be modified so as to be made consistent with nontransmissionism. We
thus conclude that, while the transmissionist simulation theory formulated by
Michaelian is incompatible with NC-episodic, transmissionism is not essential
to the simulation theory.
5 After transmissionism: Kinds of memory (er-
ror)
A nontransmissionist simulation theory will be compatible with NC-episodic.
We have thus seen that, while the (neo)classical and constructive causal theo-
ries are straightforwardly incompatible with radical enactivism about memory,
the simulation theory can be made compatible with radical enactivism, and the
procedural causal theory is compatible with radical enactivism as it stands.23
This brings us to our conclusion: while other mainstream theories would need
to be assessed separately, certain causal theories (namely, the procedural causal
theory) and postcausal theories (namely, a nontransmissionist version of the
simulation theory) can take NC-episodic on board, despite the fact that they
are not motivated by the sort of general hostility to mental content that ani-
mates radical enactivism. These theories are thus compatible with all three key
features of radical enactivism about memory.
We have left one thread hanging: the status of NC-semantic. The theories
on which we are focusing themselves focus on episodic memory. For the reasons
given above, if they adopt NC-episodic, procedural causal and simulation theo-
rists will presumably also adopt NC-semantic. But, in conjunction with another
thread that we have left hanging, namely, the status of Michaelian’s argument
in the passage quoted on page 15, this raises a question about the implications
of NC for the question of the boundaries of memory. Hutto and Peeters (2018,
113) take the passage in question to signal the simulation theorist’s commitment
to the contrary of NC. Taken in context, however, the point of the passage is not
to argue against NC, the contentless conception of traces, or nontransmission-
22See Michaelian 2016a, 201x for a response.
23That the procedural causal theory and the simulation theory are both compatible with
radical enactivism about memory does not imply that there is no significant disagreement
between them: the procedural causal theory remains a causal theory, and the procedural
causal theorist will need to find a way of resisting (the nontransmissionist versions of) the
simulation theorist’s anti-necessity and anti-sufficiency arguments.
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ism. The point is, rather, to argue for a difference in kind between declarative
memory and procedural memory; and a parallel argument can be run even if
we adopt NC, the contentless conception, and nontransmissionism.
As Tulving (2007) has pointed out, the term “memory” has tended to be used
somewhat indiscriminately. Klein (2015), in fact, has argued that the term has
been applied so widely that it has effectively been emptied of meaning. Appeal-
ing to a variety of empirical and theoretical considerations, he suggests that it
ought to be applied much more narrowly: since episodic memory alone involves
autonoetic consciousness—a phenomenal sense of the self in subjective time—
only episodic memory merits the name “memory”; the presence of autonoesis
marks a fundamental distinction between episodic memory and everything else
that has been called “memory”, including semantic memory and procedural
memory. In reply, Michaelian (2015) has argued that, if we want to carve mem-
ory at its joints, the distinctive feature of memory proper should be taken to
be not the involvement of autonoesis but rather the involvement of encoding,
storage, and retrieval of content. By this criterion, the fundamental distinction
is—assuming transmissionism—not between episodic memory, on the one hand,
and semantic and procedural memory, on the other hand, but rather between
declarative memory, including both episodic and semantic memory, on the one
hand, and procedural memory, on the other hand.24
This approach is, as noted in section 3, incompatible with NC, which says
that neither declarative nor procedural memory involves the encoding, storage,
and retrieval of content. But a parallel argument can be run even if we adopt
NC/nontransmissionism. As we have emphasized, nontransmissionists can deny
that encoding results in a contentful entity that is then stored and retrieved
while accepting that “retrieval” nevertheless itself results in a contentful state.
A nontransmissionist is thus free to say that the distinctive feature of memory is
not the encoding, storage, and retrieval of content but rather the “retrieval” of
content, where retrieval refers to the construction of a contentful representation
that corresponds to a past experience and even (perhaps) causally depends
on it via a dispositional trace it leaves behind but that does not include any
content transmitted (via a contentful trace) from the experience. Since only
declarative memory involves the construction of contentful representations, we
can still conclude that only declarative memory is really memory, i.e., that the
fundamental distinction is between declarative memory, on the one hand, and
procedural memory, on the other hand. In short, even if we acknowledge that
declarative remembering has (as Perrin would put it) a procedural character,
we can still acknowledge a difference in kind between declarative memory and
procedural memory. This is in accord with the claim, defended in section 3,
that radical enactivism is not necessarily at odds with the view that retrieved
semantic and episodic memories are contentful. As long as the acquisition of
content by declarative memories amounts to an additional step—perhaps due
to the construction of narratives, as suggested by Hutto (2017), or perhaps due
to accompanying habits to produce judgements about episodes, as suggested by
Sant’Anna and Michaelian (201x)—a nontransmissionist can hold on to the idea
that declarative and procedural memory differ in kind without appealing to a
24Strictly speaking, Michaelian’s view is that the fundamental distinction is between “cog-
nitive” and “noncognitive” memory, terms that do not map precisely on to “declarative” and
“nondeclarative”. This subtlety does not affect our argument.
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difference between them with respect to retrieval of stored content.25
Before concluding, we respond to a general worry about the contentless con-
ception of traces. One might be concerned that, if, as the contentless conception
implies, “retrieval” is not literally retrieval, not only in the sense that it is a
reconstructive process but also in the sense that there is no stored content out
of which a representation might be reconstructed, memory traces no longer play
any clear role in explaining the correspondence between the retrieved repre-
sentation and the original experience. In response to this worry, we observe
that the explanatory role assigned to traces by the procedural causal theory is
reasonably clear: the original experience of the remembered event results in a
disposition—the contentless trace—the activation of which is responsible for the
production of the (contentful) representation of the event at retrieval; the trace
is thus the primary ingredient of the explanation of the subject’s present ability
to accurately represent a past event. The explanatory role assigned to traces by
the nontransmissionist simulation theory is equally clear, though slightly less
straightforward: multiple experiences—potentially but not necessarily includ-
ing experience of the remembered event—result in a disposition—a contentless
trace—the activation of which is responsible for the production of a (contentful)
representation of an event at retrieval; the trace is thus one ingredient of the
explanation of the subject’s present ability to represent a past event, though it
does not by itself explain the accuracy of the representation, since the simula-
tionist must, given that the trace may not originate even in part in experience
of the relevant event and will in general, even when it does originate in part
in experience of the relevant event, originate also in experience of other events,
additionally invoke the reliability of the principles governing the retrieval pro-
cess. More work would, of course, need to be done to establish that either the
procedural causal theory or the nontransmissionist simulation theory is correct,
but this response should suffice to address the worry that, if one or the other of
these theories is correct, traces no longer play a clear explanatory role.
By way of conclusion, we note that radical enactivism may have implications
not only for the question of how to distinguish among kinds of memory but also
for the question of how to distinguish among kinds of memory error. Appealing
to a constructive causal theory of memory, Robins, for example, argues that the
distinction between confabulation (which occurs, very roughly, when a subject
who is unable to remember a past event instead “makes up” a more or less plau-
sible event) and misremembering (which occurs, for example, when a subject
who has studied a list of thematically-related words mistakenly remembers a
non-studied but thematically-consistent word as having appeared on the list) is
a matter of the retention of information: in confabulation, no information is re-
tained from the apparently remembered event; in misremembering, in contrast,
“[the subject’s] report is inaccurate, yet this inaccuracy is explicable only on the
assumption that she has retained information from the event her representation
25One might wonder whether a nontransmissionist simulation theorist can really say ev-
erything that Michaelian says in the passage quoted on page 15. The same thing goes for
nontransmissionist theorists in general: it is unclear how a procedural causal theorist, for
example, can say everything that we need to say about the ways in which memory feeds into
other cognitive processes and leads to behaviour without making any reference at all to stored
content. We grant that this is unclear and indeed take it to be a major challenge for nontrans-
missionism. Our goal in this section, however, has not been to show how nontransmissionists
might meet that challenge but only (more modestly) to show how they might coherently adopt
something like Michaelian’s approach to the taxonomy of memory.
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mischaracterizes” (2016a, 434; cf. 201xa; 201xb). Appealing to the simulation
theory of memory, Michaelian (2016a; 201x) has argued, in opposition to Robins,
that the distinction is, rather, a matter of reliability: in confabulation, the sub-
ject remembers unreliably; in misremembering, the subject remembers reliably
but nevertheless ends up with an inaccurate memory. Since it denies—in opposi-
tion to the constructive causal theory—that remembering involves the retention
of information, radical enactivism is incompatible with Robins’ approach, but
it is—assuming a nontransmissionist version of the simulation theory of the sort
sketched in section 4—perfectly compatible with Michaelian’s approach. Radi-
cal enactivism may thus provide additional ammunition for simulation theorists
in their ongoing debate with causal theorists.
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